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Unfinished Democracy:  
Transitional Justice in Taiwan
Abstract
The article attempts to describe Taiwan’s progress and a difficult position in practicing 
transitional justice during its democratic process. The first section reviews Taiwan’s dem-
ocratic progress and the impact on the implementation of transitional justice caused by 
a regime transition type. The second section describes Taiwan’s authoritarian rule period, 
from February 28 Incident to the White Terror’s political types of political cases. The 
third section analyses the reasons for Taiwan’s unfinished transitional justice. The article 
claims that during Taiwan’s political engineering of transitional justice, compensation 
for the victims was almost the only act of it and at the same time lacking legal or moral 
prosecution of the inflictors and the truth discovery. Taiwan has never had an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the damage caused by the system of the authoritarian rule, so that 
many inflictors or cooperators of the system have continued to serve in the democratized 
government in key positions, which has resulted in the prevailing phenomenon of im-
punity. Such a handling mode to compensate the victims, not willing to investigate the 
inflictors and seeking the historical truth, cannot solve the crime left by the authoritarian 
era alone, but it can also bring about a serious crisis of democratic governance in Taiwan.
Keywords: Transitional Justice, Human Rights, Political Reconciliation, Taiwan
Preface
The way a new democratic government deals with compensation or investiga-
tions against the previous authoritarian regime’s violations of human rights is an 
important political engineering tool to system design and policy planning to integrate 
the supporters and victims of the previous authoritarian regime as well as to find 
a balance to avoid “too many memories or too much forgotten” [Minow, 1990] 
in order to achieve political reconciliation and ensure that the immoral conduct 
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will never again be repeated, is the subject of continuing concern of the democratic 
transition society.
Like many Asian countries, Taiwan has experienced a period of colonial his-
tory and an authoritarian rule. From 1947 to 1987 Taiwan experienced a period of 
enforced martial law. In modern history, there is no country that has experienced 
such a long period of martial law. After abolishing martial law in 1987, Taiwan began 
to enter the liberalisation process, marching forward towards the so-called third 
wave of democratization. In 1996, Taiwan’s direct presidential election was held and 
Li Deng-hui was elected as the first democratically elected president. It is the symbol 
of an important milestone in Taiwan’s democratization. In 2000, it experienced for 
the first time the rotation of ruling parties. The opposition party candidate Mr Chen 
Shui-bian was elected president, defeating the Chinese Kuomintang, that had ruled 
Taiwan for nearly half a century. In 2008, Kuomintang was once again in power, 
Taiwan experienced two peaceful transitions of political power, in accordance with 
the statement of two-turn-over test [Huntington, 1991], successfully achieving the 
“democratic consolidation” stage.
Since the abolishment of martial law in 1987 till now, i.e. for more than twenty 
years, Taiwan’s democratic achievement has been considerably approved and praised 
internationally. However, there are still some issues deliberately suppressed and 
not properly solved in the past, that have gradually emerged. Transitional justice is 
one of such obvious examples. On transitional justice issues, Taiwan has followed the 
approach of “compensating the victims, but not investigating the inflictor”. However, 
such a financial compensation mechanism cannot handle all the political and social 
effects caused by transitional justice issues alone, but even affect Taiwan’s democratic 
development and political stability.
This article attempts to describe Taiwan’s progress and a difficult position in prac-
ticing transitional justice during its democratic process. The first section will be the 
review of Taiwan’s democratic progress and the impact on the implementation of 
transitional justice caused by a regime transition type. The second section will de-
scribe Taiwan’s authoritarian rule period, from February 28 Incident to the White 
Terror’s political types of political cases. The third section will analyse the reasons 
for Taiwan’s unfinished transitional justice. This article claims that during Taiwan’s 
political engineering of transitional justice, compensation for the victims was almost 
the only act of it and at the same time lacking legal or moral prosecution of the in-
flictors and the truth discovery. Taiwan has never had an opportunity to reflect on 
the damage caused by the system of the authoritarian rule, so that many inflictors or 
cooperators of the system have continued to serve in the democratized government 
in key positions, which has resulted in the prevailing phenomenon of impunity. Such 
15Unfinished Democracy: Transitional Justice in Taiwan 
nr 4(12)2016
a handling mode to compensate the victims, not willing to investigate the inflictors 
and seeking the historical truth, cannot solve the crime left by the authoritarian era 
alone, but it can also bring about a serious crisis of democratic governance in Taiwan. 
How to seriously face the transitional justice is an important topic for deepening 
Taiwan’s democracy.
What Is Transitional Justice: The U. N. Integrated 
Viewpoint
The so-called “transitional justice” refers to the idea that after a society ‘s transi-
tion from the authoritarian democratic society, the government rehabilitation work 
for justice restoration and social reconciliation should amend the political, ethnic 
or racial split caused by the previous government‘s political oppression by violating 
human rights during the authoritarian period. It seeks to recognise the victims and also 
tries to achieve peace, reconciliation and democracy. Thus “the International Center 
for Transitional Justice” has coined the following definition of transitional justice:
 Transitional justice is a response to the past institutional, large-scaled and human 
rights violation. It seeks the recognition of the victims and also tries to achieve 
peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transition justice is not special justice, 
but the justice pursuit in the changing society that has gone through the large-
scale human rights violation. … These changes are generally called democratic 
transitions, therefore such justice is called transitional justice.
Under this definition, transitional justice’s main works include: 1) Compensation 
for the people or their families who suffered from losing their bodies, freedom and 
lives, returning the confiscated property. 2) Investigation and finding out legal or 
moral responsibilities. 3) The whole presentation of the truth and history of political 
persecution1.
As an international organisation of ensuring basic human rights, the United Nations 
over the years has spared no effort to promote transitional justice, emphasising that 
the way a politically transitional country treats the legacy of the past is the premise 
of the establishment of society with the rule of law and social reconciliation2. To re-
1 The International Transition Justice Center’s work can be divided into: 1. Establishing the truth 
about the past. 2. Prosecution of the perpetrators. 3. Reparation of the victims. 4. Memory and memorials. 
5. Reconciliation initiatives. 6. Reforming institutions. 7. Vetting and removing abusive public employees.
2 According to Ruti G. Teitel’s observation, the second half of the twentieth century’s transitional 
justice experience can be divided into three periods: 1) the first period dated after World War II, judgment 
at Nuremberg was its representative. 2) the second period’s transitional justice was related to the so-called 
third wave of democratization. In particular when the Portuguese dictatorship collapsed in 1974, and 
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build trust of the society, it needs an official public acknowledgement of the fact that 
human rights were violated, asking the inflictors to take responsibilities and heal the 
wounds of the victims and their families. Therefore, in 2004 the former U. N. Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan made a remark in the Council’s report (S/2004/616) that 
in order to assist countries to guarantee basic human rights and maintain regional 
peace, the United Nations should pay special attention to the issues of transitional 
justice and the rule of law of the in or post-conflict states. Annan defined in this report 
“transitional justice” as “all procedures and mechanisms conducted and established, 
while the society handles legacy caused by a large-scaled abuse of power. It eradicates 
responsibilities, adheres justice and achieves reconciliation” [UN, 2004].
And at the U. N.’s official agencies, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights is the major body to promote and implement the works of transitional justice. 
So far, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has provided support 
to more than 20 countries’ transitional justice programmes in the world, including 
assistance in establishing the national consultation plan, support for the setting 
up of the truth commission and the establishment of mechanisms and reparations 
programmes of judicial accountability. On the other hand, in order to provide every 
country’s transitional justice reference, the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights published “the Rule-of-law tools for post-conflict States”, providing 
a complete scheme including prosecution, compensation, accusation, amnesty and 
truth commissions, as well as the collection of practical experiences and methods as 
important reference criteria for any country that pursues transitional justice.
Except for the relevant guidelines and stipulation of March 24 as the annual 
international observances for understanding the truth and defending the victims, 
emphasising the importance of keeping the memory of the victims, understanding 
the truth and publishing a series of reports, on September 26, 2011, during the 
nineteenth session of the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, the further con-
firmation of the appointment of the Special Rapporteur of the promotion of truth, 
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence was made. His term of service is 
three years and he is responsible for transitional justice-related affairs. On 22 March, 
2012 during the nineteenth session of the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, 
the former director of the International Center for Transitional Justice Pablo de Greiff 
many authoritarian regimes in South Europe, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe collapsed, the 
democratic countries in transition had to properly handle the legacy of authoritarianism, so democratic 
consolidation and implementation became the main topic of this period. 3) the third period appeared at 
the end of the twentieth century, pursuit of the transitional justice gradually became customary instead of 
a special case. The international law of war and international humanitarian law of war became substance 
of justice. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was a milestone in this period.
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was officially appointed as the Special Rapporteur of the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. His term of service is three years and 
he is responsible for transitional justice-related affairs. This also demonstrates the 
determination of the U. N.’s promotion of transitional justice. Since Pablo de Greiff 
took office, he has continuously promoted a holistic approach of transitional justice, 
emphasising the “promotion of truth”, “justice”, “compensation” and “a guarantee of 
not happening again”. These are the four elements of transitional justice, not random 
combinations of concept and experience, but related to each other having a comple-
mentary relationship. The experience of promotion of transitional justice in many 
countries has shown that the equal treatment of these four elements is to the advan-
tage of transitional justice, and the target of reconciliation could not be realised on 
the premise of absence of these elements.
For example, judicial prosecution requires not only the pursuit of truth, but 
also calls for an action, based on the revealed truth, just only revealing the truth 
is not enough to compensate for the damage caused by crime. The compensation 
scheme needs to be carried on simultaneously with the prosecution, the beneficiar-
ies of the compensation scheme would be more willing to take the compensation 
as compensation, instead of merely discretionary compensation measures. The 
final report of the Truth Commission itself is a compensation measure that helps 
to rebuild the citizen trust. And without the measures of a structural reform, such 
as vetting, it is not enough to ensure that violations will not occur again. Pablo de 
Greiff has also emphasised that the promotion of transitional justice is a process of 
pursuing civil trust. With the process of pursuing the truth, people can realise the 
fear and distrust between the victims and bystanders, citizens and the state under 
the dictatorial regime. They can also realise how under the dictatorial regime, fear 
exerts an unparalleled influence on life and effects the system maintenance because 
of timidity, cowardice and weakness caused by the political fear of bystanders. As 
the late political philosopher Judith Shklar said, the political fear provides epistemic 
foundation, that helps us understand the basis of political world and its limitations 
[Shklar, 1987].
On the other hand, in the hegemony context constructed by the previous dicta-
torial regime’s violence system, it is difficult for political victims to present exactly 
the history which is different from that one presented by the mainstream society and 
give a strong response to the truth contradictors who denied their history. Therefore, 
through the process of prosecution or pursuing the truth to let the victims and their 
families answer the oppression state of political aphasia and recognise again their 
ability of thinking, speech and action, would be an important step of the political 
reconciliation process. The goal of authoritarian regimes is to deprive the victims of 
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the opportunity to air their views, their experience and their power of description 
of their historical role. Thus, to present the victims’ voice and correct the political 
aphasia is an important prelude to the truth discovery process. And the implemen-
tation of compensatory measures can demonstrate how a political system seriously 
faced all kinds of violations in the past, so as to encourage the citizens’ confidence 
in the system. Finally, the personal vetting of public officials can show the determi-
nation of building the systematic criterion in the new democratic system, rebuilding 
the criterion of civil servants recruitment, remaining in employment and discipline 
supervision and prevent from cronyism to enhance trust in the system. If the system 
is still full of inflictors, the victims may not be willing to trust it, even though some 
of the inflictors might have been prosecuted.
More importantly, the goal of transitional justice is not only the one of collective 
healing and compensation, but to restore the political victims and their families’ po-
litical subjectivity, rebuild their rights and self-esteem of citizenship and make them 
become not only the providers of the truth, but also the participants of collective 
memory reconstruction and the citizens who actively defend collective memory. For 
example, in 2007 during the Peruvian election, political victims’ groups pointed out 
a definitely improper human rights violation record of a candidate, and they demon-
strated to express their demands. Their roles are not only the ones of the protectors 
of collective memory, but also the gatekeepers that prevent from democratic retreat 
and authoritarian restoration.
This way of transitional justice which emphasises comprehensiveness was ap-
proved on the experience level. The set up study carried on by three political scientists 
Leigh A. Payne, Tricia D. Olsen, and Andrew G. Reiter, covering 848 mechanisms 
in 161 countries over 40 years, showed that one mechanism that applies (amnesty, 
trial, truth commission) usually does not have a positive effect on the protection 
of democracy and human rights, therefore these authors emphasised that different 
mechanisms’ integration approach is better for the promotion of human rights and 
democracy [Olsen et al. 2010].
It is not easy to address and face the darkness of history, especially when those 
torts and institutions have once existed in a legal state and caused long-term fear 
and the silence of people. But from the integration approach we can see that when 
a society can, from the above-mentioned work, declare democracy and human 
rights values it respects and also declares this society’s injustice of the past, and it 
will not choose to forget and ignore, but will face the mistakes and prevent from 
further blunders. Through the truth and history, we will remind and educate future 
generations that democracy cannot be established in a society without historical 
justice. However, political persecution often results in a large-scale and a long-term 
19Unfinished Democracy: Transitional Justice in Taiwan 
nr 4(12)2016
social disruption, so that the work of pursuing transitional justice has a high degree 
of political sensitivity.
On the other hand, due to the different historical and political environment of 
different countries, different ways are often adopted to deal with the above-mentioned 
works, such as the investigation of the inflictors, because this work often endangers 
political stability and the social disruption of a new democracy, so that different 
countries take different approaches. Samuel Huntington [1991] has pointed out that 
after the establishment of a new democratic government, the factors which decide 
whether it will retrospect the crimes committed by the authoritarian regime or not, 
are not often moral or considered ethical but simply political. It means that the nature 
of the democratic transition process3 and the balance of powers4 during the transi-
tion period5 and afterwards would be an indication of whether or not and how the 
country should conduct transitional justice. Therefore, according to the differences 
between historical and political contexts, the countries should handle carefully the 
authoritarian legacy in different ways, so that the social disruption can be reconciled 
and the democratic culture can consolidate a new democracy.
Taiwan’s Authoritarian Regime and Political Transition
Many scholars have described that before 1947, the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan 
had been an authoritarian regime, and the so-called authoritarian regime was “limited, 
rather than a pluralistic and responsible regime; a spiritual, rather than ideological 
regime; a controlling, rather than mobilising regime” [Linz, 1975]. In addition, 
unlike the Philippines or any other colonised countries, which were established by 
3 Huntington has pointed out that the three ways of democratic transition will lead to different 
transitional justice promotion types: 1. Transformation: the new ruling elite conducts transformation 
from top to bottom. While the new ruling elite after transformation, still retains great political power 
(such as Spain and Taiwan). 2. Replacement: launched by the opposition, such as the Czech Republic. 
3. Trans-placement: jointly launched by the ruling and opposition parties, such as Argentina, Chile, and 
South Africa.
4 In other words, after the democratic transition, the proportion of various political forces in the 
power structure will have an impact on the proceedings of transitional justice. For example, the larger 
the older forces of the authoritarian regime are, the more difficult it will be to resolve the transitional 
justice issue.
5 The nature of an authoritarian regime will decide if the transitional justice can be put forward. For 
example, Tina Rosenberg thought that the communist regime in Eastern Europe is a criminal regime. It 
was ruled by ideological indoctrination and asked people to participate actively, support and cooperate, 
so there was less political violence during the ruling period. On the contrary, the Latin American regimes 
were the regimes of criminals, who put high pressure on ruling during their governing period. There has 
been much brutal political violence, but mainly aimed at political opponents.
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Western democratic powers, Taiwan’s institutionalisation began in the period of Ja-
pan’s imperial colonial ruling. For this reason, Taiwan’s inheritance of human rights 
and democratic values is considerably low [Cheng, 1989, p. 473].
In 1945, the Kuomintang took over Taiwan from the hands of Japan and ruled the 
territory. Later the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-Shek fled from the Communist 
Party Forces in China and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. After Chiang’s retreating 
to Taiwan in 1949, he established de facto a state – the Republic of China (R. O. C.) 
representing the political authority he had lost in China. The same year, Taiwan Gar-
rison Command declared implementation of the martial law. Yet, the implementation 
of the martial law had been based on the civil war, and it was set up to be used as 
a temporary measure. And yet the implementation of the martial law in Taiwan lasted 
for 38 years. It ended in 1987. At that time, the political atmosphere of the country 
had obviously restricted human rights and extended them to the social area by re-
pressing social movements. In the culture area, the state resorted to the ideological 
indoctrination and manipulation of mass media, so that Taiwan’s media were in the 
shackles of a series of strict legal norms and policy control of the media6.
According to Chao and Myers’ views, this kind of authoritarian regime is firmly 
committed to four political rules, the depicted boundaries between the acceptable 
and unacceptable political behavior.
1. Freeze temporarily the 1947 Constitution and take “Temporary Provisions effective 
during the period of the Communist Rebellion” as a basis of all laws in Taiwan’s 
ruling period to meet the political realities that dominated only in the Taiwan 
province. Many civil and political rights were inhibited and circumscribed7, and 
therefore the constitutional structure gave way to the authoritarian rule.
2. Maintaining one-party rule of Kuomintang. KMT emphasised that the anti-China 
policy had not ended. Even if Kuomintang regime had transferred to Taiwan, 
under incompatible thinking, the R. O. C. authorities still insisted that there is 
only one China, and the Republic of China is the sole representative of it.
3. Promoting local participation, but not allowing new political parties to assign 
candidates for election. In 1948, the Kuomintang government through “Tempo-
rary Provisions effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion” delayed the 
6 The main sources of laws and regulations are “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period 
Communist Rebellion”, “martial law” and “law of publication”. See Tien [1989, ch. 9].
7 In fact, the Constitution lists the important civil and political rights. For example, article 9 to ar-
ticle 24 of the Constitution includes the freedom of speech, assemblely and association, the freedom 
of writing and publication, the freedom of worship and the freedom of confidential communication; 
the right to work, property, education and the right to take examination to a public service and so on. 
The R. O. C. Constitution seems to be the same as that of most democratic countries in the world, but 
these rights were limited on the basis of Emergency Provisions.
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legislature elections on the central hierarchy level, so the election competition 
was limited to the local level [Cheng, 1989; Tien, 1989].
4. Permitting a limited space for the freedom of thought, but did not allow the 
existence of anything to do with Marxism, Leninism, socialism or any hypocrit-
ical criticism that might shake the legitimacy [Chao, Myers, 1994, p. 216]. The 
Kuomintang promulgated an ideology based on Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s 
Principles”, in addition, the separatism and defense of Taiwan’s independence 
were also prohibited.
Under the fetter of colonial rule and the authoritarian regime, undoubtedly, there 
were a lot of human rights violations which had occurred in the past authoritarian 
regime period. During the implementation of the martial law, human rights were 
violated. In the name of endangering national security, people could be easily ar-
rested, imprisoned or executed. For example, the prohibition of organising political 
parties by people, and a partial deprivation of the freedom of speech, the freedom 
of assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom of communication. We 
can say that, the picture of Chiang Kai-shek’s one-party dictatorship is a right-wing 
government with a half-Leninist and semi-colonial mixture.
In February 1947, that is the previous year before “the Universal Declaration of 
human rights” was issued, the Kuomintang government triggered riots across the 
island, “February 28th incident”. Nearly thousands of people were massacred, “clear-
ing up rebels report to the people” issued to search the country and eliminate rebels, 
setting up another state terror period. The peak of the state terror period occurred 
in 1955, widely known as the “White Terror” period.
Although under such a harsh political rule, ironically, the Kuomintang did 
not refuse to accept the validity of norms of the international human rights. In those 
days, the KMT was not only the U. N. member state, but it was also a permanent 
member state of the U. N. Security Council. The KMT government did not only 
assist with the adoption and signing the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, 
but it also ratified and delivered “the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment 
of the crime of Genocide” [Huang, 2001, p. 3]. Although the KMT hypocritically set 
a domestic law version of the Convention of the crime of genocide, and included it 
in Taiwan’s law books, but at the same time, “White Terror” reached a peak. In 1971, 
before Taiwan quit the United Nations, the R. O. C. had indeed signed and ratified 
seven human rights conventions, such as the International Convention of Civil and 
Political Rights, as well as the International Convention of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (two conventions for short), though once the official documents were 
completed, they were locked in the Foreign Ministry’s archival repository. In order 
to highlight the “Free China” image, the KMT government took these conventions 
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as the country’s decorative facade. During the Cold War, the American government 
regarded the R. O. C. importance as a non-communist bloc ally, and accompanied it 
to combat the People’s Republic of China, until president Carter took office and de-
cided to complete the normalisation of relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
Since 1945, the United States has accepted and protected the KMT that it could rule 
the Taiwan island effectively, emphasising that the Kuomintang regime was the sole 
legitimate government of China. After the Korean War broke out in July, 1950, Tai-
wan was taken by the United States as the “cornerstone of the Pacific Rim”, an effort 
to prevent an expansion of communist forces8. As the U. S. ally and with the United 
States’ support, despite the Kuomintang government had lost its legitimate right 
to rule in mainland China, it still maintained its declaration as the sole legitimate 
representative before 1949 [Tien, 1989, p. 217]. “Return to the mainland” slogan 
strengthened the position of the Kuomintang regime, and as a reason for internal 
implementation, the Kuomintang regime could strengthen the authoritarian rule.
In addition, since the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States committed 
to defend Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek had peace of mind without the danger of concen-
trating power in his hands and took the clearing-the-country measures immediately.
Under the martial law, a vigorous civil society could not exist. One reason was that 
most of the local elite in the “White Terror” period was killed, imprisoned, terrified or 
forced to flee, therefore an organised counterforce against the authorities was difficult 
to form. The other reason is that the implementation of the martial law successfully 
destroyed all the political counterforces that attempted to form some structures.
With the lifting of the martial law in 1987, Taiwan entered the process of lib-
eralisation, and became a part of the so-called “the third wave of democratization”. 
People’s fears began to extinct, and as Lee Teng-hui was elected president in 1996, 
Taiwan was transformed to a stable, open and democratic system. Lee Teng-hui often 
referred to the norms of the human rights to describe and comment his ruling and 
distinguished it from the others, such as Lee Teng-hui and Lee Kuan Yew’s opposing 
positions. Lee Teng-hui severely criticised Lee Kuan Yew’s so-called Asian Value 
Discourse, and was proud of his democratic achievements. The western media called 
him “Mr. Democracy”.
However, after the system change, Kuomintang did not collapse and it kept its 
ruling until 2000. This could be regarded as a special case among the countries in the 
third wave of democratization. When the process of democratization was launched, 
8 In 1954, the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty let China and America become the military 
alliance under the global strategy of Eisenhower-Dulles to contain the communist camp with military 
allies. See Tien [1989, p. 217].
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the western countries relieved stress on Taiwan’s democratic transition practice and 
transferred focus to other countries. Although the Kuomintang government did 
not deregulate certain civil and political rights, it did not actively open up more other 
rights, either. With an unreal image of a democratic country, the pressure from the 
anxious international community decreased. Finally, the Democratic Progressive 
Party as the opposition party, successfully defeated the Kuomintang government 
in the election in 2000. The new government used some measures to express its 
opposition. In May 2000, President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP promised in his in-
auguration speech that he would abide by the international human rights standards 
and hold an independent human rights conference, with reference to the recommen-
dations of the Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, 
in order to achieve his oath9. Meanwhile, President Chen Shui-bian established the 
Advisory Committee of Human Rights for which the Vice-President took the sole 
responsibility, and established the Commission of Human Rights Education in the 
Ministry of Education.
However, during the eight years of ruling by DPP, its promotion of transition 
justice did not exceed the Lee Teng-hui era. They focused on the issues such as redress 
for the Kaohsiung Incident and the recovery of the KMT party assets. The former one 
was at stake with the self-evaluation from outside the party becoming the ruling party 
and the publication of related books; the latter made Taiwan’s society ignore the real 
meaning of transitional justice, so many people regarded the idea of the “recovery of 
the Kuomintang assets” as synonymous with transitional justice and the distinction 
between blue and green parties. Until the second term, President Chen Shui-bian 
began to take more specific transitional justice measures. For example, in 2004 he 
directly gave an order to the Defense Department with the political force to inspect 
the rebellion case. But once more the alternation of political parties in 2008 made 
the KMT regain power, and during the new presidency, Ma Ying-jeou’s attended the 
official ceremony of the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror” year by year, 
yet, he was not willing to apologise. At the same time he also uninterruptedly paid 
homage to the dictators such as Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo at their 
mausoleum, showing his remembrance to the former heads of state. It is obvious 
that the leader who represented the KMT regime did not understand the moral 
and cognitive conflict between the two, not to mention any measures related to the 
transitional justice conducted by this man or his regime.
As Samuel Huntington [1991] pointed out, that after the establishment, the factors 
which decided whether or not or how the new democratic government retracts crimes 
9 See http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/chen/chen01.htm
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of the authoritarian regime were not moral or considered ethical but the nature of 
the democratic transition process as well as the power of balance during and after 
transition decided whether or not and how this state conducts transitional justice. 
When Taiwan’s transitional justice project was conducted by the ruling elite from 
top to bottom, the old ruling elite after the transition, still retained a great political 
power in Taiwan. As a result, during the democratization process, unlike in other 
emerging democratic countries, Taiwan did not establish a dedicated institution 
like “the commission of truth and reconciliation” to deal with transitional justice, 
resources and public power. On the contrary, Taiwan government’s dealing with the 
authoritarian legacy overweighed compensation for victims of political cases, paying 
almost no attention to the introspection of the flawed system, even the works related 
to the cardinal democratic values such as a serious investigation of historical truth, 
and tracing legal or moral responsibilities.
Taiwan’s White Terror Political Case Type
After the declaration of the martial law in Taiwan on the 20th of May in 1949, 
according to “the martial law” Article 8 (the expansion of military jurisdiction), the 
crime of insurrection and treason committed during the martial law period could be 
judged by military authorities or by court. And since the criminal law was promul-
gated and implemented in 1935, Article 100, paragraph 1 states: the one who intended 
and began to implement damage to the state, usurpation of the land or change of 
the country’s constitution by illegal means, subversion of the government, could be 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, and the first colluder would be sentenced 
to life imprisonment. The second paragraph: the one who prepares or conspires 
to commit the previously mentioned crimes could be sentenced to imprisonment, 
at least six months to five years. It means that not only could the conspirators be 
punished, and the idea of “begin to implement” was not only limited to the use of 
violent and coercive methods, but also the common crime of insurrection could be 
committed on grounds of the ideological level.
Thus, in 1948 the Republic of China entered the period of the Communist Re-
bellion, in 1949 Taiwan imposed martial law, which ended in 1987. During those 38 
years of the martial law regime, many civilians were involved in the crime of insur-
rection, treason, like all kinds of political cases mentioned above, and were judged 
by the martial court improperly including the native Taiwanese or Mainlanders and 
all kinds of occupation at different levels of education. Those who held an official 
post in the army were judged more severely by the martial court because of the nature 
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of ruling at that time. Among so many political victims, the well-known ones after the 
lifting of martial law were interviewed several times or wrote down their memoirs, 
so that future generations could learn little about them and the incidents. But there 
are more political victims who have never told others about their own experiences 
and who died gradually without leaving historical witnesses10.
After the lifting of the martial law in Taiwan, many scholars got engaged in po-
litical case studies11 but due to the lack of oral history, the blockade of archives, we 
are still unsure how many people suffered from political persecution during the long 
period of martial law, and we have no statistical analysis of the case type so that the 
description of the “political victims” research number is vague and the gap is very 
big. Citing the survey of Hsieh Tsung-min [2007], Li Hsiao-feng [2001] thought that 
there were 140 thousand people suffering but Hsieh Tsung-min who based on Li Ao’s 
saying, believed that there were in total over 29 thousand political cases. This was 
due to the long-term negligence of Taiwan’s transitional justice works, and the lack of 
activity and blockade of the opening of official political archives, so the whole image 
and the number of political victims of the White Terror could not be really obtained. 
However, we still have some access to the powerful file of reference from the currently 
known data. The most worthy reference data: one is the showdown inspection of the 
rebellion in which Chen Shui-bian of DPP gave order to the Ministry of Defense 
to conduct after he had been reappointed. The “inspection on the special case of 
rebellion and spies for China’s communists trial during the martial law period” was 
published by the Ministry of Defense in 2005. The case file shows the rebellion and 
spies during 1945–1994 who were sentenced by the Ministry of Defense. There were 
in total 16,132 people involved, including the arrested, sentenced as well as those 
who possessed only a case card data. The second was the number of 7,838 people 
who received compensation till April 2013, after “the Compensation Ordinance on 
10 By the end of 2007, a group of Taiwanese scholars along with culture and history workers who 
were concerned about transitional justice set up “the Committee of truth and reconciliation in Taiwan”, 
beginning a long-term “interview program of political victims in the authoritarian regime period”, which 
trained nearly 100 young interviewers and conducted interviews with 239 victims and their families, many 
of them were of old age but it was the first time they gave a detailed account of their suffering experience. 
There were also young scholars like Lin Chuan-kai who, at their own expense, conducted oral history 
interviews with the underground Communist Party members in the fifties, to clarify Taiwan’s White Terror 
history. In these civil spontaneous actions of “pursuing historical truth”, we could gradually join together 
to track people’s experiences during the authoritarian period. One of the most important discoveries was 
to dig out more types of cases and a further analysis of the structure and influence on history.
11 Such as Jang Yan-shian’s study of the Taiwan independence case, Chen Cui-lien’s [2009] study of 
the spy system, Fan Yen-chiu [2009] study of indigenous rebellion against the elite, Wu Jui-jen [2008] 
research into the establishment of the state, Chang Yen-hsien, Chen Feng-hua [2000] interview study 
of Hsueh Hua-yuen, Yang Hsiu-ching [2004] study of the history of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime and 
democratic process, Li Shiau-feng’s study of political cases types.
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the false trial cases of rebellion and bandit spies during the martial law period” had 
passed, including 6,638 people sentenced or subject to resocialisation. The Com-
pensation fund has got a large number of official political archives and statistics of 
the death penalty time and provincial statistics through the victims’ own statement, 
which is very good for reference. Although the exact data remain an estimation for 
further study, and the above conclude two political cases and the related criteria are 
different, but the above indirect data are available as the basic framework for White 
Terror case analysis. For example, whether there were 16,132 or 6,868 cases and in the 
fifties those cases accounted for 60 or 70 percent of all.

















Source: By May 12 2008, estimated by legal section of the compensation foundation on the false trial cases of 
rebellion and bandit spies during the martial law period.
On the other hand, according to the compensation data statistics of the com-
pensation foundation of the rebellion false trial cases and bandit spies during the 
martial law period, there were 57% Taiwanese political prisoners, other provinces 
accounted for 43%. With regard to their occupation, most of them were soldiers 
and civil servants. The rest of them belonged to all kinds of occupations, including 
a quite large number of students. Although there were more victims of Taiwanese 
origin, but the proportion of the involved mainlanders to the whole population is 
higher. All the involved represented many trades and professions: after 1953, Taiwan 
approximately broke up with the Communists. In order to affirm the ruling entity and 
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the number of refugees to be resettled, a census was conducted in 1956. At that time 
the non-native population was about 930,000 plus 270,000 of the military personnel 
without a permanent address, which constituted 13%, i.e. 9.37 million of Taiwan’s 
population. However, the proportion of mainlanders involved was 30% of the total, 
among them the death penalty proportion was up to 23% of the total death penalty12.
Table 2.  Compensation Foundation and Jang Yan-shian “Provincial and Death Penalty 
Statistics According to Written Courts’ Decrees”
Category Province 1949–1960 1961–1987 Total
General
Native 2,799 449 3,248
Mainlander 907 514 1,421
Death penalty
Native 600 12 612
Mainlander 139 47 186
Source: the project plan of the compensation foundation on the false trial cases of rebellion and bandit spies 
during the martial law period “the analysis of number and type of Taiwan’s post war political cases (1949–1987), 
p. 61. Led by Chiu Jung-chu and co-led by Chang Yen-hsien and Tai Pao-tsun. Realization time from September 
2008 to June 2009 (Unpublished).
This type of political cases has quite a heterogeneous nature. For example, Chang 
Yen-hsien (Project Plan [2008]) has pointed out that according to the detailed cases 
in the written judgments, it could be divided into 18 categories. With regard to the 
quantity, “underground Communists”13 constituted one-third of the total, but since 
1961, the decline has been quite big. The “suspected bandits” also represented one-
third, evenly divided during the whole martial law period14. In addition, the “trai-
tors favored by propaganda” represented 30%, especially after 1961, the proportion 
increased a lot15.
12 But in addition to the known political cases, there is still unknown the number of mainlander 
political victims who died in the July 13 event on Penghu’s, Navy Pioneer Camp, all kinds of collective 
secret executions or in the cases which can be known well till now.
13 By the end of 1945, Tsai Shiau-chian and the others, planned the Working Committee of the Taiwan 
province, adopting the Leninist revolutionary vanguard party principles, clandestine activities and sin-
gle-line leadership. So, at that time, several underground organisations such as the Working Committee 
of the Taiwan Province, Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, Patriotic Youth Association, etc., 
were in fact all consensually developed underground systems. They were led by the East China Bureau of 
Shanghai and guided by several commissioners of the Working Committee of the Taiwan province, trying 
to develop the “Municipal Working Committee” and “District Working Committee” and other three “Posts 
and Telecommunications, Students and Mountain Working Committee”. In the local system, the “branches”, 
“groups” and “peripheral organisations” were developed according to township’s administrative regions.
14 The so-called “suspected bandits” includes ideological leftists, bandit spy supporters, hiding the 
message of the bandit spies, hiding up, employment or suspected attach to the bandit spies, not confessing 
one’s crime, being captured, etc.
15 “Traitors favored by propaganda” includes propaganda for bandits, listening bandit’s broadcast, 
graffitti, publishing dissatisfied remarks. Today the above mentioned behavior seems to belong to the 
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Table 3.  Compensation Foundation and Jang Yan-shian “Provincial and Death Penalty 
Statistics According to Written Judgments”
Case classification 1949–1960 1961–1987 Total
The underground Communist Party 339 134 473
Suspected bandits 183 258 469
Traitors favored by propaganda 45 271 316
Taiwan independence organisations 6 52 58
Reading groups 5 25 30
Democratic movements 1 2 3
Indigenous independence movements 0 2 2
Other political forces or groups 13 5 21
Political power struggle 0 1 1
Soldiers going over to the enemy 16 11 27
Leaking military secrets 22 45 67
Leaking official secrets 5 3 8
Illegal military groups 4 3 7
The intention of mutiny 2 3 5
The intention of using forces against the government 0 3 3
Students drafted into the army 2 0 2
Framing others 14 30 44
Others (including being not guilty) 3 1 4
Total 660 849 1,509
Source: a project plan of the compensation foundation of the false trial cases of rebellion and bandit spies during 
the martial law period “the analysis of number and type of Taiwan’s post war political cases (1949–1987), p. 58. 
Led by Chiu Jung-chu and Chang Yen-hsien and Tai Pao-tsun. Realisation time from September 2008 to June 
2009 (Unpublished).
The Unfinished Task of Taiwan’s Transitional Justice
During Li Teng-hui’s term of office, the first commemoration of the February 28 
Incident appeared overseas in the 1950 s, but only in 1987 the “February 28 Incident 
Peace Promotion Association” and the vindication movement started by the Presbyte-
rian Church on the island, revealing the twilight and giving different sounds together 
with Taiwan’s emerging social movements. On March 23th, 1995, the Legislative Yuan 
passed “The February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act”, and in De-
cember the same year, the Executive Yuan set up the “February 28 Incident Memorial 
Foundation”. In 1997, the whole text of “The February 28 Incident Disposition and 
free thought and expression level, but the penalty for it could be resocialisation ranging from three years 
to life sentence.
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Compensation Act” was corrected, and the word “compensation” was changed into 
“indemnification”. On June 17th, 1998, the Legislative Yuan passed “The Compensa-
tion Act” of the false trial cases of rebellion and bandit spies during the martial law 
period”; till July 31th, 2014, a total of 8,030 people accepted compensation16.
During Li Teng-hui’s term of office, in addition to the compensation as well as 
the memorial events, the transitional justice issues still could not make progress. 
Wu Nai-te thought that the reason why transitional justice could not be successfully 
pushed forward in Taiwan was that the ruling party of the authoritarian regime after 
the democratic transition, under the leadership of Li Tenghui, stayed in power for over 
a decade. It was impossible that the KMT automatically examined its human rights 
violations in the past, more impossible to deny its own past. Li Teng-hui’s long-term 
career in public service during the authoritarian regime and with the relationship be-
tween him and Chiang Ching-kuo, established the basic direction and tone for Taiwan’s 
pursuing transitional justice [Wu Nai-te, 2006, pp. 1–34]. During Li Teng-hui’s term 
of office, he set up “The February 28 Incident study group” to study the truth about 
this incident, published “The February 28 Incident Reports”, built many memorials 
dedicated to “The February 28 Incident” victims and they were given compensation. 
And so the White Terror victims were grateful to Li Teng-hui. However, 38 years of 
the long White Terror in Taiwan’s postwar history did not get any clear a long time 
after lifting the martial law. The scars of the people who suffered were still fresh, but 
they already did not know the origins of it. Even though the democratic changes 
had been introduced in Taiwan, the Taiwanese society did not have an opportunity 
to understand their dark history and a wave of national violence which had taken 
place around the whole island. So, later almost all disputes related to the White Terror 
were lost during the transitional justice work because of the political and social con-
text. The significance of the so-called “historical truth” reappeared through various 
examples of human rights violations in the past authoritarian regime. For example, 
after interviewing some historians about political prisoners, they concentrated on 
16 In terms of compensation of victims, “The February 28 Incident Memorial Foundation” was estab-
lished in 1995. “The compensation foundation on the false trial cases of rebellion and bandit spies during 
the period of martial law” was established in 1998, which was responsible for compensating the victims 
of the White Terror political repression. The compensation objects of these two foundations were differ-
ent, but with the same compensation standard. The compensation for executions or disappearances was 
six million NT. The compensation for imprisonment was 500 000 NT for each year, with the maximum 
imprisonment compensation not more than 5 million NT. The compensation for property loss was up 
to 2 million NT, but one person could get no more than six million NT in total. That is, if a victim was 
in custody for 10 years, the compensation for property loss he could get was only one million NT. If he was 
in custody longer than 12 years, the compensation he could get in total was five million NT. Compared 
to other countries, such as Argentina, the compensation standard was not generous. Argentina’s annual 
per capita income is only one-third of Taiwan’s, but the compensation for those who lost their lives is 
22,000 USD (more than 7 million NT) [Wu Nai-te, 2006].
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a few, selected people and most of the records portrayed those participants who took 
part in political incidents, it is not only difficult to describe more clearly a ruling 
structure at the same time neglecting the stories of life of those particular individuals 
in the context of social interaction. As a result, the Taiwan community fails to clearly 
sketch the ruling structure of the martial law period, so that the Taiwan community, 
which formerly lacked the awareness of the White Terror, got a one-sided impression 
of political cases. This caused the backlash in a democratic society, such as acknowl-
edging that it was the martial law that ensured Taiwan not to be taken over by the 
Communists during the civil war with the KMT. Or else, the Taiwan society often 
regarded “pursuing historical truth” as “tearing ethnic groups” and provoking “the 
wounds of history”. This is not only because of people’s ignorance about “transitional 
justice”, but also because of the lack of democratic and historical education in Taiwan. 
If stories of the people had not been recorded in annals and spread in the society, then 
those figures would have been used by many different authorities to their advantage 
and the so-called “history” would have become an useful tool for the official service. 
Therefore, from the oral history of the White Terror we could learn that among those 
who suffered political persecution, some were accused of being traitors with revolu-
tionary aspirations in their whole life, but there were still some victims who, because 
of fear or for self-protection reasons, admired and believed the government and 
their leaders, who apparently did the harm. And those women who belonged to the 
families of political prisoners and were under political and social oppression, never 
got an aura of political victims but had experienced so much suffering, which would 
also never be justified. The historical image of the White Terror was not just limited 
to the data and the process of “cases”. Furthermore, it was the real life experience of 
the political victims and their families. In the martial law regime and an atmosphere 
of political fear of that time, in addition to the political victims themselves, their 
families were also inevitably swept and overwhelmed by the political storm. Apart 
from the political oppression and fear, they had to face the collected social exclusion 
and indifference. However, Taiwan’s understanding of history of this period is still at 
the stage of repeating what others have said.
For example, in June 2011, the former premier Hau Pei-tsun, during his new book 
launch entitled “Interpretation of Chiang Kai-shek’s diary from 1945–1949” declared 
that “the saying of the White Terror is to demonise the KMT! Generals who came 
from mainland to Taiwan were mostly involved. There were no native Taiwanese at 
all”. Hau said that the spy cases found out in the martial law period, mostly related 
to the mainland generals, such as the chief of general staff Wu Shih, major general 
Tsai Hsiao-chieh, lieutenant general Li Yu-tang, as well as the espionage case of 
Wang Hsiao-po’s mother. They were all mainlanders. “There were no natives among 
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those who had been checked out“! Hau thought that Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT 
government’s conduct was “the first step to defend Taiwan”! In October 2011, when 
Hau Pei-tsun paid tribute to Chiang Kai-shek in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, 
once again he said: “There would be no freedom and democracy without martial 
law in the past. The media tend to reverse causation; the measures taken were very 
severe during the White Terror period and some injustice cases were caused by private 
grudges, but that was in order to eliminate communists hidden in Taiwan’s society. It 
was not a political mistake of martial law17”. Hau Pei-tsun’s statement highlighted that 
the terror of the state’s violence was because it had rationalised their way of persecuting 
people. After rationalisation, even if it did wrong, it does not have to understand or 
apologise. The lack of sentiments and ignorance to the authoritarian period in his-
tory and defense of human rights show that Taiwan’s government repeatedly missed 
the chance to investigate its past conduct of injustice, making no effort to achieve 
complete transitional justice18.
Instead of a Conclusion
Comparing the current trends of the international communities, Taiwan is obviously 
outside the international trends. Taiwan’s democratization has more than 20 years. 
It has not only failed to establish dedicated agencies to handle transitional justice, 
but also the government and civil achievements of this work is not complete. In the 
political projects of transitional justice, Taiwan’s only action was the compensation 
to victims, but it almost did nothing in the area of legal or moral prosecution of in-
flictors and truth discovery. There is still a lot of unknown truth about the political 
trials of the February 28 Incident and the White Terror period. The controversy has 
arisen around the recent events of “the history curriculum” and “the citizen and social 
studies curriculum”, which were changed in senior high schools, trying to remove 
17 His remarks triggered protests from groups such as Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconcili-
ation, Taiwan Association for Human Rights, Dr Chen Wen-chen Memorial Foundation, Deng Liberty 
Foundation, Taiwan Alliance to End Death Penalty, Humanistic Education Foundation and Taiwan Labour 
Front, which published a joint statement that “No democracy without martial law? To condemn former 
premier Hau Pei-tsun’s remarks”.
18 This fact highlighted that Hau Pei-tsun and those in power, as the state’s ruling elite still ignored 
the existence of the people who experienced violence afflicted by the state, even if the Compensation 
Foundation has been established for 10 years, the national archives gradually have been opened and the 
oral history materials continued to accumulate. The context of his remarks means that four thousand 
native victims who accepted compensation did not exist, all levels of the mainland victims who came 
to Taiwan. In 1949 the government did not exist, the low-level mainland victims in the Penghu case and 
the naval case, the anti-Communist freedom fighters and fellow mainland citizens who came to Taiwan 
in the 60 s did not exist.
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the fact of the White Terror history, highlighting the ruling authority’s ignorance 
of the historical facts and obviously attempting to glamorise the authoritarian 
regime. Taiwan has never had an opportunity to reflect on the persecuting system 
of dictatorship. According to Article 10 of martial law, people can appeal from the 
determinate sentences of the military authorities. But the ruling authorities, in the 
eve of the lifting of martial law modified Article 9 in “The National Security Law”, 
prohibiting appeal of the political cases. Later on, the Grand Justices in Interpretation 
no 272 decided that the regulation coincided with the constitutionality and necessity 
of maintaining stability and social order, so that Taiwan cannot prosecute, judge and 
investigate public officials who had been suspected of unlawful acts (including torture, 
illegal measures to get confessions, framing up), so many institutional inflictors or 
cooperators of the system continued to be in key positions in the government after 
democratization, which resulted in the prevalence of impunity. The government has 
not set up an investigative mechanism of “The Truth Commission” actively putting 
into resources the conduct investigation or published the historical truth, responding 
to the victims’ dignity, sorting and opening archives, encouraging research and the 
promotion of human rights education, etc., so that the understanding of Taiwan’s 
history in this authoritarian regime period has still been at the level of repeating 
what others say. Recently, the archives bureau has used the excuse of the “Openness 
of Government Information Act” and “Personal data Protection Law” to hinder the 
accessibility and usage of political archives, keeping the truth of a lot of political 
cases being unknown. More seriously, this way of compensating the victims but 
not investigating the inflictors and pursuing the truth cannot solve the legacy left 
by the authoritarian era, but it can cause a more serious crisis which may appear 
in Taiwan’s democratic governance.
Because of the special diplomatic situation, for a long time Taiwan’s society has 
not been familiarised with the United Nations and their related resolution documents, 
as well as the international human rights system of the United Nations, not to mention 
the understanding of the efforts the United States has recently made on transitional 
justice projects. Some people may question it, as Taiwan is not a member state of 
the United Nations, what sense it makes to discuss the United Nations’ integrated 
approach to transitional justice issues, when reflecting on Taiwan’s situation. In fact, 
on February 25–28, 2013, Taiwan held its first international review of the initial re-
ports of two international conventions, among the members, several of which who 
had held important positions for a long time in the United Nations were scholars 
of international human rights law and promoters of transitional justice issues, such 
as Manfred Nowak and Theo Van Boven. Manfred Nowak has served as the special 
rapporteur of the United Nations for torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment or punishment. He is an internationally renowned international human 
rights law scholar. The person worth mentioning is Professor Theo Van Boven. The 
Professor served as a special rapporteur of the United Nations’ torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and also as a special rapporteur 
for special report subcommittee of victims’ rights to compensation. On Decem-
ber 16, 2005, the United States passed “The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” of 
Resolution no. 60/147, in which there was pointed out the obligation of the state 
to assume responsibility for the massive violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law, as well as to reaffirm the victims’ rights to obtain compensation 
(General Assembly resolution no. 60/147), and it clearly defined what a victim is. 
This criterion was set by Van Boven and another scholar Cherif Bassiouni, which 
was also called Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles. During the review process, the 
transitional justice issues in the official report were not mentioned, fully showing 
the government’s indifference toward the transitional justice issues. The author of 
this article represents Taiwan’s Association for Truth and Reconciliation. In the 
review of the core documents and while raising the problems of our government’s 
promoting transitional justice, the aim is to provide relevant information for review 
by the committee, expecting to get a positive response from Professor Van Boven 
and other members. Then during the review process of the official report, Professor 
Van Boven, as expected, raised this issue that was not in the official report, asking 
relevant departments to put forward specific proposals and responses. In 24 and 25 
points out of the last 81 points (Concluding Observations and Recommendations) of 
the General Assembly, specific proposals on pushing forward the transitional justice 
were raised, echoing at the same time the basic elements which the United Nations 
highlighted, such as pursuing the truth, adhering to justice, making compensations.
24. Oppression and massive human rights violation before the lifting of martial law 
left huge scars in the R. O. C. (Taiwan’s) society. In order to heal the historical wounds 
and compensate the victims, the government has taken some measures, including 
passing the February 28 Incident handle and compensate ordinance, and constructing 
the February 28 Incident monument. However, the transition period is not over, the 
government has to do more to help to bring about the reconciliation of society. The 
right to compensate should include recovery at the social and psychological level of 
the victims, as well as the right to pursue truth and justice.
25. Experts suggested that the government should take measures to reveal the 
whole truth of massive human rights violation during the White Terror era. In ad-
dition, as the justice compensation required, the government should confirm the 
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torture and suffering the victims experienced. In this regard, the government should 
ensure that the victims and the researchers are able to have effective access to the 
relevant national archives.
This is the first time Taiwan, according to its own approach and norms, has taken 
part in the review of the human rights report, which was compiled by the United 
Nations. After the meeting, President Ma Ying-jeou held an international press 
conference, vowing solemnly that he would take the experts’ proposes to fulfill the 
idea of the “human rights ruling”. When a year passed, as the international review 
ended, the spotlight was no longer on the report, the ruling government seemed 
to forget about the commitment to those suggestions. We were not surprised by the 
development of the situation. However, we should continue to make good use of 
specific recommendations made by the international experts to maintain close con-
tacts with the international human rights network, air the voices of the international 
community, exerting pressure on the government and urging it to fulfill the specific 
recommendations made by the experts, so that the goal of achieving transitional 
justice will be no longer the politicians’ political rhetoric of making promises and 
not keeping them. If we continue to ignore it, we will not ensure that the goal of 
being never again could be reached, we will also disregard the suffering of the po-
litical victims and their families. Taiwan has missed a lot of opportunities to pursue 
transitional justice. The way how to deal with these transformation projects related 
to the values such as democracy, justice and human rights, will be the government’s 
urgent political commitment and it should be an important indicator for the people 
to examine the government’s administrative achievement.
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